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ARTICLES 
 
Confrontation and Hearsay Issues in 
Federal Court Terrorism Prosecutions 
of Gitmo Detainees 
MOUSSAOUI AND PARACHA AS HARBINGERS?* 
Norman Abrams† 
In tribute to Professor Margaret A. Berger 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Margaret Berger is best known as a 
distinguished Evidence scholar on the subject of expert 
testimony. Her work includes, however, an important paper on 
the Confrontation Clause, published in 1992, titled, The 
Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal 
for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model,1 which was one of the 
earliest articles to foreshadow Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
in the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford v. 
Washington.2  
I dedicate this paper as a tribute to Margaret’s oeuvre 
on evidence and in celebration of that article, noting that she 
presciently anticipated the general change of direction by the 
Court, although Crawford took a different, related doctrinal 
  
 * © 2010 Norman Abrams. All rights reserved. 
 † Professor of Law Emeritus and Acting Chancellor Emeritus, UCLA 
 1 76 MINN. L. REV. 557 (1992). 
 2 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Scholarly works cited by Justice Scalia in Crawford 
include AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 125-31 
(1997) and Richard Friedman, Essay, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 
86 GEO. L. J. 1011 (1998). Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61; see also Benjamin E. Rosenberg, 
The Future of Codefendant Confessions, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 516 (2000). 
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approach to the application and scope of the Confrontation 
Clause.  
This paper will examine the implications of the 2004 
Fourth Circuit compulsory process decision in United States v. 
Moussaoui,3 and also refer to its 2008 Second Circuit progeny, 
United States v. Paracha.4 It will use the doctrine of those 
cases, considered in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Crawford and Davis v. Washington,5 as the basis for an exercise 
to examine how certain types of confrontation and hearsay 
issues might be analyzed in future terrorism prosecutions in 
the federal courts—applications that neither Justice Scalia nor 
Professor Berger may have anticipated.  
II. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON AND PROFESSOR BERGER’S 
PROPOSAL 
It is, of course, familiar stuff to evidence scholars that 
Crawford dramatically shifted the Court’s approach to the 
Confrontation Clause, holding that “[t]estimonial statements of 
witnesses absent from trial” are admissible “only where the 
declarant is unavailable and only where the defendant has had 
a prior opportunity to cross-examine [the witness].”6 The key to 
this new doctrinal development is the notion of testimonial 
statements, which Justice Scalia, relying on and applying the 
history behind the Confrontation Clause, described in the 
following terms: 
An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers 
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark 
to an acquaintance does not. The constitutional text, like the history 
underlying the common-law right of confrontation, thus reflects an 
especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court 
statement. 
Various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” statements 
exist, [e.g.]: “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—
that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior 
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar 
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be 
used prosecutorially” . . . . These formulations all share a common 
  
 3 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005). 
 4 313 F. App’x. 347 (2d Cir. 2008). The circuit opinion, which was not 
certified for publication, treats the relevant issues summarily. For a fuller treatment, 
see the district court opinion, United States v. Paracha, No. 03-CR-1197(SHS), 2006 
WL 12768 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006). 
 5 547 U.S. 813 (2006).  
 6 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 
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nucleus and then define the Clause’s coverage at various levels of 
abstraction around it . . . . 
Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations 
are also testimonial under even a narrow standard. Police 
interrogations bear a striking resemblance to examinations by 
justices of the peace in England. The statements are not sworn 
testimony, but the absence of oath was not dispositive.7 
Twelve years before Crawford was decided, Professor Berger 
advocated a related approach:  
Hearsay statements procured by agents of the prosecution or police 
should therefore stand on a different footing than hearsay created 
without government intrusion. The Confrontation Clause should bar 
hearsay statements elicited by governmental agents unless the 
declarant is produced at trial or unless special procedures [which she 
later describes] . . . are followed.8 
Both approaches would apply the Confrontation Clause to 
hearsay statements obtained by governmental agents for use at 
trial. The main difference appears to be that Justice Scalia 
uses a doctrinal category, “testimonial statements,” to 
characterize the type of hearsay covered by the Confrontation 
Clause while the emphasis under Professor Berger’s proposal is 
on the fact that the statement was procured by government 
agents and on government behavior. Rather than relying on a 
formulaic approach, she proposes one that would focus on the 
circumstances of the particular case and identify whether 
inappropriate forms of prosecutorial behavior were involved: 
Inter alia, she recommends that contemporaneous recordings 
be used in appropriate cases to ensure that the prosecutor or 
police did not pressure, induce, or manipulate the declarant 
into making the statement. She views the Confrontation 
Clause as a limitation on government action, as a way of 
keeping “the overwhelming prosecutorial powers of the 
government in check.”9 
Use of the formulaic approach led Justice Scalia in 
Davis v. Washington to add a qualification to the definition of 
“testimonial,” and a key question for this paper is how broadly 
the Davis doctrine is to be interpreted. The very use of the 
definitional term, “testimonial,” thus carries with it 
  
 7 Id. at 51-52 (quoting Brief of Petitioner at 23, Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410)). 
 8 Berger, supra note 1, at 561-62. 
 9 Id. at 562. 
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substantive implications. It is not clear whether Professor 
Berger would recognize a similar categorical limitation since 
governmental action would still be involved even in situations 
excluded from the coverage of the Confrontation Clause under 
the Scalia approach in Davis. If not, her approach would sweep 
more broadly than Justice Scalia’s and might bring more 
statements under the protection of the confrontation mantle.  
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DAVIS V. WASHINGTON 
As noted above, Crawford ruled that the introduction 
into evidence by the prosecution of out-of-court statements that 
are testimonial, where the declarant is unavailable and the 
statements had not been subject to prior cross-examination, 
violates the Confrontation Clause. Davis v. Washington 
qualified Crawford by treating as nontestimonial certain types 
of statements elicited by police questioning.10 Recall that in 
describing the category of testimonial statements, Justice 
Scalia in Crawford stated: “Statements taken by police officers 
in the course of interrogations are . . . testimonial under even a 
narrow standard.”11 We learn, however, from Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Davis v. Washington about statements obtained 
through police questioning that are nontestimonial: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution. 
. . . . 
. . . When we said in Crawford . . . that “interrogations by law 
enforcement officers fall squarely within [the] class” of testimonial 
hearsay, we had immediately in mind (for that was the case before 
us) interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past 
crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the 
perpetrator. The product of such interrogation, whether reduced to a 
writing signed by the declarant or embedded in the memory (and 
perhaps notes) of the interrogating officer, is testimonial. . . . A 911 
call, on the other hand, and at least the initial interrogation 
conducted in connection with a 911 call, is ordinarily not designed 
  
 10 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 11 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
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primarily to “establis[h] or prov[e]” some past fact, but to describe 
current circumstances requiring police assistance.12 
In Davis, Justice Scalia drew a distinction that had not 
surfaced in Crawford—between testimonial and nontestimonial 
statements that result from police interrogation. The 
distinction rests principally on what was “the primary purpose 
of the interrogation.”13 If the interrogation is “solely directed at 
establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to . . . provide 
evidence to convict . . . the perpetrator,” it is testimonial.14 If its 
primary purpose was “to meet an ongoing emergency,” or was 
“designed primarily . . . to describe current circumstances 
requiring police assistance,” it is non-testimonial.15  
As we shall see further along in this paper, Crawford 
and Davis combined with Moussaoui and Paracha provide the 
basis for a line of argument that might be used to address 
confrontation concerns that would arise when the government 
tries to offer into evidence the results of the interrogation of 
suspected terrorists. 
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF UNITED STATES V. MOUSSAOUI AND 
UNITED STATES V. PARACHA  
A. Compulsory Process/Classified Information Issues 
Zacarias Moussaoui was indicted for a series of 
terrorism offenses including involvement in the conspiracy that 
led to the horrific acts on September 11, 2001. The 2004 
decision of the Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in United 
States v. Moussaoui,16 the final direct review opinion among 
numerous Moussaoui decisions in the course of this 
prosecution, addressed compulsory process-classified 
information issues in the case. 
United States v. Paracha17 involved similar issues, 
though the charges in that case were based on identification 
document fraud and providing material support to al Qaeda in 
aid of terrorism. In Paracha, the district court relied heavily on 
  
 12 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 826-27 (citations omitted). 
 13 Id. at 822. 
 14 Id. at 826. 
 15 Id. at 827-28. 
 16 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005). The opinion 
in volume 382 was a revised version of an earlier opinion, 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 17 No. 03-CR-1197(SHS), 2006 WL 12768 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006). 
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the Moussaoui opinion, and the circuit court summarily 
affirmed the lower court decision.18 The significance of these 
two Paracha opinions is not what they add substantively 
(though they do add slightly to the earlier Moussaoui case), but 
rather the fact that they are subsequent decisions that appear 
to indicate that, at least in a terrorism prosecution context, the 
Moussaoui doctrine that we examine in this paper is not “a 
derelict on the waters of the law.”19 
The Moussaoui Fourth Circuit decision, by 
happenstance, was handed down immediately after the 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Crawford v. Washington. 
Accordingly, while Crawford is mentioned twice in Moussaoui,20 
the references are brief. Neither the government’s nor the 
defendant’s brief in Moussaoui mentioned Crawford (since both 
briefs were prepared before the Crawford decision), although 
they do address some confrontation issues.21 Moussaoui is 
generally and correctly perceived as primarily involving, at a 
constitutional level, compulsory process issues; it is not a 
confrontation or hearsay decision. Yet, as discussed below, 
because of the way the court formulated its opinion, arguments 
regarding confrontation and hearsay issues in terrorism 
prosecutions can be derived from the case. 
At the outset, two aspects of the Moussaoui opinion 
should be noted, which, while they make it more difficult to 
determine its meaning, do not prevent us from digging into the 
doctrine of the case. First, because the case involves classified 
information, the opinion is heavily redacted so that particular 
sentences are inconclusive and hard to decipher. (However, 
somewhat surprisingly, one can reasonably guess at some of 
the words that were deleted from the opinion.) Second, after 
the Supreme Court denied certiorari review of the circuit 
court’s opinion under consideration here, Moussaoui pleaded 
  
 18 United States v. Paracha, 313 F. App’x. 347, 351 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 19 Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 332 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., joined by 
Harlan, J. and Whittaker, J., dissenting). It should be kept in mind that Moussaoui is a 
Fourth Circuit opinion, and that Circuit has had the reputation of being one of the 
most conservative in the nation. See Neil A. Lewis, Obama’s Court Nominees Are Focus 
of Speculation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, at A19 (suggesting that because of the large 
number of potential appointments to that bench, President Obama has the possibility 
of turning the conservative Circuit quickly around). The fact that Moussaoui was 
followed by the Second Circuit in Paracha is therefore not without significance. 
 20 See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 461, 481. 
 21 See Brief of Appellee at 81-84, Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (No. 03-4792); see 
also Brief for the United States at 48-60, Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (No. 03-4792). 
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guilty.22 The circuit court opinion had contemplated further 
action in the district court: the judge was expected to apply the 
approach mandated by the circuit majority to the substitutions, 
but the guilty plea served, to an extent,23 to limit such action 
and also served to insulate the circuit court opinion from 
further direct review.  
As it turned out, subsequently, Moussaoui attempted to 
withdraw his plea of guilty and in January 2010, a different 
circuit panel issued an opinion that revisited some of the 
relevant issues. This new opinion did not, however, change the 
essential conclusions of the first panel.24 
An important part of Moussaoui’s defense had been to 
show that he was not involved in the 9/11 conspiracy. One of 
the important issues in the case revolved around Moussaoui’s 
efforts to obtain testimony from three individuals, enemy 
combatant witnesses (the “ECWs”) at the time allegedly in U.S. 
custody abroad, who were alleged to be key al Qaeda members 
involved in the 9/11 conspiracy.25 Moussaoui asserted that these 
individuals could provide exculpatory testimony on his behalf—
that he had not been involved in the 9/11 conspiracy.26 At the 
time, the government declined officially to acknowledge that 
these men were in custody, assuming that they were only for 
purposes of allowing the court to make a ruling whether to 
issue a subpoena ad testificandum. The government refused, on 
grounds of national security, to produce the ECWs in person or 
to make them available so their depositions could be taken.27 
In an effort to resolve the impasse thereby created, a 
compromise was attempted by the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals—to prepare substitutions for the testimony of these 
three witnesses. While the case did not directly bring into play 
the Classified Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”),28 because 
live witness testimony was at issue, both the district and 
circuit courts relied heavily on the CIPA approach for dealing 
with classified evidence that the government does not wish to 
  
 22 United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 23 See id. at 271-72, 276 (“The substituted statements of . . . several other 
terrorists were . . . admitted as evidence during the sentencing proceedings.”). 
 24 See id. at 284-85. In considering Moussaoui’s attack on his conviction and 
attempted withdrawal of his plea of guilty, the January 2010 opinion reiterated the 
previous panel’s justifications for treating the substitutions as reliable. See id. 
 25 Id. at 271, 287. 
 26 Id. at 271. 
 27 See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 456-57 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 28 See 18 U.S.C. APP. 3 §§ 1-16 (2006). 
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produce because of concerns about the need for secrecy and 
confidentiality.29 An important tool under CIPA for dealing with 
such evidence is to fashion substitutions, usually summaries, 
which do not disclose any of the information that the 
government wishes to keep confidential, but provide a 
defendant with enough evidence to enable him/her to make 
his/her defenses.  
The district court had concluded that the substitutions 
that had been offered by the government did not and could not 
adequately protect the defendant’s right to defend himself.30 
Reversing the lower court on this point, the circuit panel 
concluded that, with more work and participation by the 
district judge and the parties in the preparation of the 
substitutions, both the government’s national security interests 
and the compulsory process and right-to-defend interests of the 
defendant could be adequately protected.31 
The substitutions approved in principal by the court had 
unique features. They were summaries, but of what? The 
witnesses had not given depositions. Rather, detailed 
statements (1) from the putative three ECWs, labeled by the 
court as A, B and C, had been obtained, apparently through 
interrogation, by government agents seeking intelligence that 
could be used in preventing future terrorist actions and 
apprehending other terrorists.32 (We do not address in this 
paper any issues arising out of claims that the statements at 
issue might have been obtained by government agents or their 
surrogates through interrogation involving torture or other 
forms of coercion.)  
The statements thus obtained from A, B, and C had 
then been “recorded” in “highly classified” reports (2) which had 
been prepared for “use in the military and intelligence 
communities; they were not prepared with this litigation” in 
mind.33  
Portions of the reports were then “excerpted and set 
forth in documents prepared for purposes of this litigation”34 
  
 29 See, e.g., Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 471-72, 476-77. 
 30 See Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 284. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 458. 
 33 See id. at 458 n.5. 
 34 Id. 
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which were labeled summaries (3). The summaries were 
provided to defense counsel35 who had security clearance.  
Finally, the substitutions (4) to be offered into evidence 
were prepared from the summaries. These largely consisted of 
the summaries of statements that had been obtained over the 
course of several months but were not identical to these 
summaries since in preparing the substitutions, the 
government had reorganized the information.36 
It is apparent from the foregoing that there were 
multiple levels of hearsay involved in the substitutions that 
were being considered by the court, with A, B, and C being the 
declarants at level 1, supra, and the declarants involved in the 
preparation of the documents labeled as levels 2-4 being 
unnamed government agents or employees. 
The district court had “deemed the substitutions 
inherently inadequate because the . . . reports, from which the 
substitutions were ultimately derived, were unreliable.”37 In 
part this was because “it cannot be determined whether the . . . 
reports accurately reflect the witnesses’ statements . . . . The 
[district] court further commented that the lack of quotation 
marks in the . . . reports made it impossible to determine 
whether a given statement is a verbatim recording . . . .”38 
Responding to the district court’s concerns, the circuit 
court stated: 
The answer to the concerns of the district court regarding the 
accuracy of the [Redacted] reports is that those who are [Redacted] 
[ed. interrogating (?)] the witnesses have a profound interest in 
obtaining accurate information from the witnesses and in reporting 
that information accurately to those who can use it to prevent acts of 
terrorism and to capture other al Qaeda operatives. These 
considerations provide sufficient indicia of reliability to alleviate the 
concerns of the district court.39 
In the foregoing passage, the circuit court addressed two 
issues: first, whether the information obtained from A, B, and 
C was reliable, which it dealt with by stating that the 
questioners had “a profound interest in obtaining accurate 
  
 35 The district court noted “that it had been impressed with the accuracy of 
the summaries.” See id. at 478 n.30 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36 See id. at 478-79. 
 37 Id. at 478. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
1076 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:4 
information from the witnesses”;40 and second, the accuracy of 
the recording of those statements in the reports, to which it 
responded with the statement, “[they] have a profound 
interest . . . in reporting that information accurately.”41 
Relying on the fact that the interrogators’ motivation 
was to obtain accurate statements from A, B, and C for 
intelligence purposes (and, implicitly, that they were experts in 
this activity) and that the documents recording those 
statements were prepared in aid of a similar purpose, the court 
concluded that with adequate work by the district court and 
the parties, the substitutions could be prepared in a form that 
was reliable, and in that form the defendant could introduce 
them into evidence. Finally, the court ruled that the defendant 
was entitled to have the fact that the substitutions are reliable 
communicated to the jury via an appropriate instruction.42  
The court did not expressly parse the multiple levels of 
hearsay involved in this material, nor did it expressly identify 
the hearsay element that presented the greatest challenge to 
the court’s overall assessment that the substitutions were 
reliable, namely the reliability of the original statements by the 
declarants. The court did briefly further address reliability of 
this first level, however, when it made the following statement:  
To the contrary, we are even more persuaded that the [Redacted] 
process is carefully designed to elicit truthful and accurate 
information from the witnesses.
43
 
Here the court seemed to introduce an additional idea to the 
argument based upon the government agents’ motivation to 
obtain accurate information: the very process [of interrogation 
(?)] was carefully designed to obtain truthful and accurate 
information.  
In discussing the reliability of these out-of-court 
statements, the circuit court did not expressly mention the 
hearsay rules or discuss the issues in traditional hearsay 
terms. This is only somewhat surprising. Although the 
substitutions were hearsay and the court was addressing a 
traditional hearsay concern—namely, reliability—the court 
here was dealing with a compulsory process issue, not a 
confrontation/hearsay issue. The evidence sought in this case 
  
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 478-79. 
 43 Id. at 478 n.31. 
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was hearsay, in the context, to be introduced by the defendant, 
not by the prosecution, and ordinarily a party cannot (and 
usually does not) complain about hearsay weaknesses of 
evidence that he/she has offered or seeks to introduce. Further, 
the opponent of the evidence to be offered, i.e., the prosecutor, 
was not likely to raise a hearsay objection because the court’s 
approach held promise of resolving the difficult compulsory 
process/classified information issues in the case that might 
otherwise have turned out to be an obstacle to obtaining a 
conviction.  
Although it was the defendant who wished to introduce 
the evidence in question, he was not totally in control of the 
form of the evidence that might be presented. So, this was not a 
typical situation in which a party may not be heard to complain 
about hearsay that it offered into evidence.  
United States v. Paracha involved a similar context and 
set of issues and the court relied on the Moussaoui approach in 
addressing the matter. Without calling any special attention to 
it, the district court in Paracha included in the jury 
instructions an additional ground that bore on the 
circumstantial reliability of the first level of hearsay in that 
case: 
The failure [on the part of the witnesses/interrogatees] to provide 
truthful information would be detrimental to any relationship to the 
United States government by the witnesses.
44
 
Like the Moussaoui court, the district court in Paracha did not, 
however, address the issues raised by these documents in 
terms of traditional hearsay categories. 
By giving instructions in Moussaoui and Paracha that 
the exculpatory45 statements contained in the substitutions 
were reliable, both courts figuratively leaned over backwards in 
favor of the defendant. Otherwise, absent a resolution of the 
impasse, the government might have been faced with the 
  
 44 United States v. Paracha, No. 03-CR-1197(SHS), 2006 WL 12768, at *15 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006). The sentence was probably included in the instructions 
because Paracha’s counsel had requested an instruction, which the court rejected, to 
the effect that the witnesses/declarants in question were providing assistance to the 
U.S. government. See id. at *14 n.2. Instead the court gave the indicated instruction 
which on its face seemed to suggest that the witnesses had some special relationship to 
the government, which would motivate them to tell the truth. 
 45 See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 479-82; Paracha, 2006 WL 12768, at *14-16. 
Note that in Moussaoui, the court conceded that not all of the statements in the 
substitutions were exculpatory. See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 473. The government had 
argued that a number of the statements in fact incriminated the defendant. See id. 
1078 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:4 
prospect of a court-imposed sanction dismissing the 
prosecution. In assessing the courts’ actions here, it seems fair 
to conclude that in each of the cases, the court was trying to be 
responsive to the concerns about whether the defendant’s right 
to make his defenses would be infringed if neither the 
witnesses requested, nor their depositions, were produced. 
What is worth emphasizing, however, is not why both 
courts did what they did, but rather, what they did. To ensure 
that each defendant’s right to defend himself was not infringed, 
the courts gave each defendant the benefit of an instruction 
that the substitutions and the exculpatory statements 
contained therein were obtained under circumstances that 
indicated that the statements were reliable. 
It is the fact that both courts concluded that a) the 
statements were obtained for terrorism intelligence purposes 
(“in aid of the pursuit of terrorists and prevention of acts of 
terrorism”), and b) that in the circumstances the statements 
were reliable, which makes it possible to think about deriving 
arguments regarding confrontation and hearsay issues from 
these decisions. We discuss these lines of argument in the next 
section. 
B. Addressing Possible Confrontation and Hearsay Issues 
in a Hypothetical Federal Prosecution of a Gitmo 
Detainee 
1. A Hypothetical Situation 
Suppose that the issue of the admissibility of 
Moussaoui-type substitutions were to arise in a future federal 
court terrorism prosecution.46 Assume, however, that the 
  
 46 In 2009, Attorney General Eric H. Holder (appointed by President Obama), 
announced that it had been decided to prosecute some of the Guantanamo detainees in 
a federal district court in New York City while others would be prosecuted in military 
commission trials under the rules and procedures established by Congress in the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, as amended in 2009. Press Release, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Departments of Justice and Defense Announce Forum 
Decisions for Ten Guantanamo Bay Detainees (Nov. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-ag-1224.html.  
  In the military commission proceedings, the statutory rules for dealing 
with hearsay and coerced confessions are different from the rules applied in civilian 
courts. (In light of the decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008) 
(holding that enemy combatants tried in military commissions could not be deprived 
access to the federal writ of habeas corpus), a lurking set of questions is whether and to 
what extent specific constitutional protections will be available to detainees being 
prosecuted in military commission trials. Specifically, will they be protected by the 
Confrontation Clause? If so, the discussion in the text regarding confrontation clause 
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substitutions contain statements that incriminate the 
defendant and resulted from the interrogation of detainees 
whom the government is unable to produce. Assume further 
that this time it is the prosecutor who offers the substitutions 
containing these statements into evidence against the 
defendant.47 Admissible? Are there arguments derived from the 
opinions in Moussaoui and Paracha doctrine that can be used 
in addressing this issue? 
2. Implications of Crawford and Davis for the 
Confrontation Issue 
To understand the potential significance of the 
Moussaoui and Paracha doctrine applied in confrontation and 
hearsay contexts, we briefly return to the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington. 
Recall that Davis qualified Crawford by ruling that not all 
statements obtained from police questioning are testimonial. 
We quote again from the text, supra, that describes the 
  
issues would be relevant as well to military commission proceedings. Cf. Al-Bihani v. 
Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that Confrontation Clause does not 
apply in habeas corpus suits, applies only in criminal cases). The discussion in the text 
regarding a hypothetical prosecution assumes that it occurs in a federal district court. 
Given the impending prosecutions, the issues addressed in the hypothetical situation 
could turn out to be not quite so hypothetical.  
 47 A question may be raised as to whether this hypothetical scenario is 
realistic. Is the government likely to attempt to introduce against one of the 
Guantanamo detainees on trial for terrorist offenses a statement implicating him 
obtained through government interrogation from one of his alleged accomplices? 
Attempting to introduce into evidence against a defendant an accomplice’s statement 
obtained by the police is not an uncommon practice.  
  Of course, if the witness/declarant is in government custody, under the 
confrontation doctrine applicable in the federal courts, the government would have an 
obligation to produce him if he was available, rather than use his hearsay statement. 
One can imagine situations, however, in which the witness/declarant is unavailable. 
He might, for example, as some terrorist detainees have done, refuse to cooperate with 
the proceedings, or he may be unavailable for some other reason. 
  Whether in a real case, the use of the Moussaoui-type substitutions would 
be involved if the government were attempting to offer a detainee’s statement into 
evidence might depend on the circumstances. If the detainee-declarant is unavailable, 
the government might offer into evidence the fruits of its interrogation of that 
individual, which might be in the form of intelligence reports gleaned from 
interrogations conducted for intelligence purposes. If these intelligence reports 
contained sensitive information, there might be a need to summarize them and prepare 
the same kind of substitutions used in the Moussaoui case. On the other hand, if there 
were no need to classify information in the report, preparing summaries and 
substitutions would not be necessary. Note that at the time, in Moussaoui, the 
government was not even willing to admit that it had the witness/declarants in 
custody. 
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grounds for distinguishing between testimonial and 
nontestimonial statements: 
The distinction rests principally on what was “the primary purpose 
of the interrogation.” If the interrogation is “solely directed at 
establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to . . .provide evidence 
to convict . . . the perpetrator,” it is testimonial. If its primary 
purpose was “to meet an ongoing emergency,” or was “designed 
primarily . . . to describe current circumstances requiring police 
assistance,” it is non-testimonial.48  
Given the distinction drawn by Davis, an argument can 
be made, based on Moussaoui-Paracha, for addressing the 
confrontation concerns posed in our hypothetical situation. 
Those two courts indicated that in those cases the purpose of 
the interrogation of the suspected terrorists (the ECWs) by 
government agents was to provide intelligence to prevent other 
catastrophic terrorism events from occurring and to apprehend 
other dangerous terrorists. The two cases relied on the fact that 
the government interrogators had a purpose other than trying 
to obtain evidence to convict the suspected terrorists. 
Generally, the existence of such an alternative purpose avoids 
many of the concerns that lie behind the Crawford doctrine. 
But, as mentioned below, Davis is subject to varying 
interpretations. Does the alternative purpose of the 
interrogation fall within the specific terms of the Davis 
doctrine?  
While this alternative purpose may not have involved 
an “ongoing emergency,” it is arguable that it was intended to 
obtain information regarding “current circumstances requiring 
police assistance [action?].” Preventing terrorism events that 
may soon happen may not amount to an “ongoing emergency” 
of the very immediate type involved in Davis (although even 
that point is debatable), but it has some similar characteristics. 
Certainly, the government can argue that the purpose of the 
interrogation was geared to an urgent need to obtain 
information quickly in order to prevent the occurrence of 
serious terrorism events that could occur at almost any time. If 
the interrogations occurred in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, 
the argument would be bolstered. Most importantly, it can be 
emphasized that the primary purpose of the interrogation was 
not to establish the facts of a past crime. 
  
 48 See supra text accompanying notes 13-15. 
2010] CONFRONTATION AND HEARSAY ISSUES IN TERRORISM CASES 1081 
What is the likelihood that prosecutors in future cases 
would be successful in using this application of Moussaoui-
Paracha as a basis for responding to the serious confrontation 
concerns posed in our hypothetical situation? It has been 
suggested by scholars that Justice Scalia’s opinion in Davis 
leaves room for differing interpretations of the kinds of police 
questioning that fall under the nontestimonial label; that the 
phrases used, such as “primary purpose” and “ongoing 
emergency” are “extremely ambiguous” and the ambiguity 
enables the judges to manipulate the concepts.49 Some scholars 
have focused on the requirement of an ongoing emergency.50 
Still others suggest that the Crawford-Davis testimonial test is 
“almost arbitrary in its result” and no better than the earlier 
reliability approach.51 
If the courts were prepared to invoke the Moussaoui 
doctrine in this way, they would want to be certain that the 
result would not open the door to application of the doctrine in 
ordinary criminal prosecution contexts. Suppose, for example, 
that in an ordinary prosecution the police claim the purpose of 
the interrogation is to discover information that would be 
helpful in apprehending one of the defendant’s partners, not to 
help convict the defendant. One can imagine that the courts 
would formulate some kind of limiting principle(s) to avoid 
such a result—e.g., that the alternative purpose must not be ad 
hoc but must amount to a sustained and continuing 
intelligence-gathering effort, or as in Davis, must be the 
“primary purpose.”52 In Davis, the emergency nature of the 
situation may also be viewed as the Court’s way of limiting the 
  
 49 See Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis and Way Beyond, 15 J.L. & 
POL’Y 553, 563 (2007) (describing the potential for unpredictable and unfair rulings 
after Davis); see also Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence Cases after Davis: Is the 
Glass Half Empty or Half Full? 15 J.L & POL’Y 759, 775-77 (2007). 
 50 See, e.g., Roger Kirst, Confrontation Rules after Davis v. Washington, 15 
J.L. & POL’Y 635. 641-44 (2007). Professor Kirst also details in his article how in the 
wake of the Davis decision the Supreme Court disposed of cases applying the Davis 
criteria.  
 51 Raeder, supra note 49, at 776. While ambiguous general terms were used 
in the Davis opinion, Justice Scalia did, however, also mention specific facts that can be 
argued to limit the scope of application of the doctrine. For example, the fact that the 
interrogations took place in a calm setting and the statements were made in response 
to a series of questions with the “officer-interrogator taping and making notes of . . . 
[the] answers” were mentioned as factors in favor of treating the statements as 
testimonial. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827. Invocation of such specific facts from the Davis 
situation, would provide a basis for arguing that the Davis exception should not be 
applicable in our hypothetical situation. See Raeder, supra note 49, at 775-76. 
 52 Compare the “significant purpose” standard established for obtaining a 
warrant under the FISA statute. Cf. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803, 1804(a)(7)(B) (2006). 
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scope of the exception. In our hypothetical, the exigency and 
urgency of finding other terrorists before they perpetrate acts 
of catastrophic terrorism may be viewed as a similar type of 
limitation.53 
One might reasonably expect that the rationale of 
Moussaoui-Paracha would be invoked by the government to 
address the confrontation issue thus raised. While, given the 
arguments that can be made on both sides of the testimonial-
nontestimonial issue, invocation of Moussaoui-Paracha would 
not guarantee that the government would prevail, it does 
provide a line of plausible, nonfrivolous arguments on the 
confrontation issue. In a prosecution of a serious terrorist 
defendant, such an argument would have a reasonable chance 
of success. 
3. Addressing the Hearsay Issues in the Hypothetical 
Prosecution 
If the government were successful on the confrontation 
issue, there would be a further set of questions to consider. As 
Justice Scalia wrote in Crawford, “Where nontestimonial 
hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ 
design to afford the States flexibility in their development of 
hearsay law . . . .”54 If a court were to conclude that the 
statements at issue in our hypothetical situation are 
nontestimonial under Davis and therefore not inadmissible 
under the Confrontation Clause, it would be necessary to 
address the question whether the statements are nevertheless 
inadmissible under the jurisdiction’s rules governing hearsay.  
The hypothetical case assumes a prosecution in a 
federal court; accordingly, the Federal Rules of Evidence would 
be applicable. Here, too, Moussaoui-Paracha appears to provide 
a basis for developing a line of arguments to address the 
  
 53 Compare the following: On March 1, 2010, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on the question: 
whether preliminary inquiries of a wounded citizen concerning the 
perpetrator and the circumstances of his shooting are nontestimonial because 
they were “made under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency,” that emergency including not only aid to a wounded victim, but 
also the prompt identification and apprehension of an apparently violent and 
dangerous individual? 
Michigan v. Bryant, No. 09-150. 2010 WL 680519, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2010).  
 54 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004). 
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hearsay issues. We have previously described the several levels 
of hearsay involved in the Moussaoui case, and the rationales 
articulated by the Fourth Circuit in support of the reliability of 
all of those hearsay levels. We also identified the most serious 
hearsay weakness in the multiple levels of out-of-court 
statements—the fact that the original statements resulting 
from the interrogation do not appear to have any special indicia 
of reliability. How would the hearsay issues thus raised play 
out under the Federal Rules of Evidence? 
a. Qualifying Levels 2-4 Under the Federal Rules 
In addressing the admissibility of levels 2-4 in our 
hypothetical situation, conceivably, the prosecutor might 
invoke Federal Rule of Evidence 807, the Residual Exception, 
which deals with “[a] statement not specifically covered by Rule 
803 or 804, but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness”55 and then rely on the type of arguments made 
in Moussaoui regarding the reliability of the documents at 
issue there.56  
More likely, however, the prosecution would first argue 
that all of the levels of hearsay except the first level, i.e., the 
interrogatee’s statements, fall under the hearsay exception set 
forth in Rule 803(8), Public Records and Reports, which 
provides:  
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of 
public offices or agencies, setting forth . . . (B) matters observed 
pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a 
duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters 
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel . . . 
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate 
lack of trustworthiness.57 
Recall that the materials in question in our 
hypothetical—i.e., the substitutions—are based upon 1) the 
statements made by the interogatee, 2) the recording of those 
statements, in direct or indirect form, in reports, 3) the 
summaries of those statements and 4) the reorganizing of that 
material to make up the final form of the substitutions. An 
  
 55 FED. R. EVID. 807. 
 56 There are additional requirements in Rule 807, for example, that the 
evidence is “more probative on the point than any evidence which the proponent can 
reasonably procure,” but we focus here on the equivalent trustworthiness element. Id. 
 57 FED. R. EVID. 803(8). 
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argument can plausibly be made that levels 2) to 4) of the 
stages in the preparation of these substitutions amount to the 
preparation of reports by public officials under a duty to report 
within the meaning of Rule 803(8). The key question would 
then be whether they fall within the exclusion in that section 
applicable to criminal cases, for matters observed by police 
officers and other law enforcement personnel.  
An often-cited case on the exclusion for police officer 
observations is United States v. Quezada58 which addressed the 
exclusion clause in the following terms: 
While some courts have inflexibly applied the Rule 803(8)(B) 
proscription to all law enforcement records in criminal cases, . . . we 
are not persuaded that such a narrow application of the rule is 
warranted here. The law enforcement exception in Rule 803(8)(B) is 
based in part on the presumed unreliability of observations made by 
law enforcement officials at the scene of a crime, or in the course of 
investigating a crime: ostensibly, the reason for this exclusion is that 
observation by police officers at the scene of the crime or the 
apprehension of the defendant were not as reliable as observations 
by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of 
the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal 
cases. 
. . . . 
. . . This circuit has recognized that Rule 803(8) is designed to 
permit the admission into evidence of public records prepared for 
purposes independent of specific litigation. . . . In the case of 
documents recording routine, objective observations, made as part of 
the everyday function of the preparing official or agency, the factors 
likely to cloud the perception of an official engaged in the more 
traditional law enforcement functions of observation and 
investigation of crime are simply not present. Due to the lack of any 
motivation on the part of the recording official to do other than 
mechanically register an unambiguous factual matter . . . , such 
records are, like other public documents, inherently reliable.59 
Quezada thus reasoned that the basis for the exclusion was 
that police officer observations at the scene are not reliable 
whereas other types of public official observations that have 
inherent reliability are not within the exclusion, such as 
records prepared for purposes independent of specific 
litigation—situations where there is a lack of any motivation 
  
 58 754 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 59 Id. at 1193-94 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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on the part of the official to do other than mechanically register 
unambiguous factual matters.  
It is arguable that the Moussaoui alternative purpose—
the motivation to obtain accurate intelligence that could be 
acted upon by agents in the field in order to prevent future 
terrorist actions, not to gather evidence to be used in 
litigation—provides comparable grounds for concluding that 
the recordings and reports of the statements contained in the 
substitutions are “inherently reliable.”  
Thus, some of the same arguments for treating the 
substitutions as nontestimonial under the Crawford 
confrontation doctrine, can be invoked to support qualifying all 
but the first level of hearsay in the substitutions under Rule 
803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and for not applying 
the criminal case/matters-observed-by-police exclusion in that 
rule.  
However, the ultimate admissibility of levels 2-4 is 
dependent under Rule 803(8) on whether “the sources of 
information . . . indicate a lack of trustworthiness.”60 If the 
statements made by the detainee-declarants as summarized in 
the substitutions are deemed unreliable and “indicate a lack of 
trustworthiness,” nothing of the substitutions—that is, levels 
2-4—is admissible.61 
  
 60 FED. R. EVID. 803(8). 
 61 The Moussaoui arguments discussed in the text up to this point can be 
offered in support of the reliability of the reporting, summarizing and recordings 
actions of the government agents and to respond to any questions raised with respect to 
levels 2-4 under the last clause of Rule 803(8), “unless the sources of information or 
other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness,” FED. R. EVID. 803(8), but the 
question of the reliability of the first level statements remains and must be separately 
treated. 
  In Crawford, Justice Scalia stated that business records, which are 
analogous to public records are “by their nature . . . not testimonial.” Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004); see also, e.g., United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 
F.3d 678, 680 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (holding items in an immigration file akin to 
business records are non-testimonial in nature). 
  Regarding the question of whether the business records exception in the 
FED. R. EVID. 803(6), Records of Regularly Conducted Activity, which does not have a 
criminal case/matters-observed-by-police exclusion might be used in lieu of FED. R. 
EVID. 803(8), see United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 78 (2d Cir. 1977). Numerous 
cases have interpreted and limited Oates. These authorities are collected in JACK B. 
WEINSTEIN, JOHN H. MANSFIELD, NORMAN ABRAMS, MARGARET A. BERGER, 
EVIDENCE—CASES AND MATERIALS 710-14 (9th ed. 1997).  
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b. Can the Interrogatees’ Statements (Level 1) Be 
Qualified Under the Federal Rules? 
i. Intrinsic Circumstantial Reliability 
As previously mentioned, the first level of hearsay, the 
interrogatee’s statements to the government agents in response 
to questioning, presents the most problematic of the hearsay 
issues raised in the hypothetical situation.  
The hearsay issue thus posed falls within the general 
category of a declarant’s statements resulting from police 
interrogation being offered into evidence by the prosecution in 
the trial of his alleged accomplice. Efforts have often been 
made in the past, relying on the declaration against penal 
interest exception, to introduce such statements into evidence. 
It has been argued that such statements have intrinsic 
reliability that comes from being against the penal interest of 
the declarant. The asserted “against interest” features of a 
statement that inculpates a co-conspirator are, however, a 
complicated subject that has been addressed by scholars62; and 
the Supreme Court, in a series of cases culminating in Lilly v. 
Virginia,63 usually ruled against the admissibility of such 
statements. 
Conceivably, there might be some other type of special 
circumstances that would be suggestive of intrinsic 
circumstantial reliability of interrogation statements. A 
possible example of such a special circumstance might be the 
kind of facts underlying the aforementioned instruction given 
in the Paracha case, which suggested that the declarants had a 
motive to tell the truth arising out of the fact that they had 
developed a relationship with the government interrogators 
which they were interested in maintaining.64 The implication 
was that to lie to the interrogators would put that relationship 
at risk.  
  
 62 See generally, e.g., Daniel J. Capra, Essay, Amending the Hearsay 
Exception for Declarations Against Penal Interest in the Wake of Crawford, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2409 (2005); John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1797 (2001); Sarah D. Heisler, My Brother, My Witness Against Me: 
The Constitutionality of the “Against Penal Interest” Hearsay Exception in 
Confrontation Clause Analysis, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827 (2000); Roger W. 
Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the Confrontation Questions in Lilly v. Virginia, 53 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 87 (2003). 
 63 527 U.S. 116, 116-17 (1999). 
 64 See supra note 44, and accompanying text.  
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This type of rationale is a weak ground for a claim of 
circumstantial reliability. Would it mean, for example, that the 
hearsay statements of an informer who works regularly with 
the police should be viewed as having intrinsic reliability 
because of his desire to maintain the relationship and whatever 
benefits accrue to him therefrom?  
Whatever the merits of this specific type of claim, the 
Paracha instruction is an example of a claim of reliability 
based upon specific facts for a hearsay statement that does not 
fall under a specific exception. To be independently qualified, 
the statement would have to meet the standards of Rule 807, 
the Residual Exception, that is, circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness equivalent to those under Rule 803 or 804.65 
We also learn from Lilly v. Virginia, however, (which 
was decided under pre-Crawford confrontation-trustworthiness 
standards), that under the then-applicable constitutional 
doctrine, the requirements for meeting residual 
trustworthiness standards in a case involving accomplice 
hearsay resulting from government interrogation and 
inculpating a criminal defendant are likely to be very difficult 
to meet: 
It is clear that our cases consistently have viewed an accomplice’s 
statements that shift or spread the blame to a criminal defendant as 
falling outside the realm of those “hearsay exception[s] [that are] so 
trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to 
[the statements’] reliability.” . . . The decisive fact, which we make 
explicit today, is that accomplices’ confessions that inculpate a 
criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the 
hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence. 
. . . . 
The residual “trustworthiness” test credits the axiom that a 
rigid application of the Clause’s standard for admissibility might in 
an exceptional case exclude a statement of an unavailable witness 
that is incontestably probative, competent, and reliable, yet 
nonetheless outside of any firmly rooted hearsay exception . . . . 
When a court can be confident—as in the context of hearsay falling 
within a firmly rooted exception—that “the declarant’s truthfulness 
is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of cross-
examination would be of marginal utility,” the Sixth Amendment’s 
  
 65 The claim of reliability would also be relevant to the issue regarding levels 
2-4 under FED. R. EVID. 803(8) applying the clause, “unless the sources of 
information . . . indicate lack of trustworthiness.” See supra notes 60-61 and 
accompanying text. 
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residual “trustworthiness” test allows the admission of the 
declarant’s statements. 
. . . .  
It is highly unlikely that the presumptive unreliability that 
attaches to accomplices’ confessions that shift or spread blame can 
be effectively rebutted when the statements are given under 
conditions that implicate the core concerns of the old ex parte 
affidavit practice—that is, when the government is involved in the 
statements’ production, and when the statements describe past 
events and have not been subjected to adversarial testing.66 
Although the Court’s expressed view of the 
“presumptive unreliability that attaches to accomplices’ 
confessions that shift or spread blame,” was written in a 
setting involving a constitutional issue under pre-Crawford 
standards, it would seem to bear generally on questions 
regarding the unreliability of such statements. It suggests that 
invocation of the Moussaoui-Paracha rationale based on a 
claim of intrinsic reliability because of special circumstances 
relating to the declarant’s statements would be faced with a 
strong presumption of unreliability.  
ii. Extrinsic Circumstantial Reliability 
A closer examination is also warranted of the specific 
elements underlying the Moussaoui court’s conclusion that the 
first level statements are sufficiently reliable based on extrinsic 
factors, that is, not arising from the intrinsic nature and 
content of the statement or motive of the declarant, but rather 
from the motivation and methods of the government agents 
who obtained the statements from the ECWs. The question is 
whether these factors, which were relied upon by the court in 
Moussaoui, are sufficient to establish circumstantial 
trustworthiness for purposes of Rule 807.67 
The motivation and methods argument advanced by the 
court in Moussaoui can be broken down into three parts. The 
first part takes the following form: Ordinary police 
interrogators are motivated to obtain convictions—whether of 
  
 66 Lilly, 527 U.S. at 133-34, 136-37 (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted). 
 67 That is, whether the motivation of the interrogators to obtain accurate 
information (plus the implied appeal to the expertise of the interrogators) and the fact 
that the process of interrogation is “well designed” for such a purpose, are in 
combination sufficient circumstantial guarantees of the reliability of the statements. 
See FED. R. EVID. 807.  
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the person being interrogated or other persons. That 
motivation may shape how they question and the direction of 
their questioning. Government intelligence agents, such as 
those who interrogated the ECWs, are motivated to find other 
terrorists and prevent terrorist actions. They need completely 
accurate information for this purpose. They have no motivation 
to shape the direction of the information they obtain other than 
in ways designed to ensure that totally accurate information is 
obtained that will help them find terrorists and prevent acts of 
terror. However, it is a long leap to conclude that, because the 
interrogators are motivated to obtain accurate information they 
do indeed obtain accurate information from the persons whom 
they have interrogated.68 
The second part of the argument which can be inferred 
from the Moussaoui opinion assumes that the interrogators 
have special expertise. What kind of expertise? We assume the 
claim is that the interrogators are persons of high intelligence, 
sensitivity and psychological insight who are able to make 
judgments about people, the logic of their stories, and to 
discern factual inconsistencies and flaws in the stories being 
told; that they also have the ability to make judgments about 
personalities, mannerisms, candor, dissembling, 
disingenuousness and the like, that make them specially 
capable of distinguishing truth-telling from false stories or 
  
 68 There is a different tack that might be taken in addressing the Moussaoui 
court’s conclusion that the statements of the ECWs were reliable—namely, introducing 
nonhearsay evidence regarding the reliability of the statements in an effort to meet the 
reliability threshold of FED. R. EVID. 807. The court’s comments suggested that the 
government agents viewed these statements as reliable; the implication was also that 
the government used and acted upon the information from the ECWs in the work done 
by government agents in the field to apprehend terrorists and prevent acts of 
terrorism. Suppose the question is whether testimony regarding such government 
actions should be admissible to prove the reliability of the statements made by the 
ECWs—that is, offering the government’s actions to prove the belief of the government 
to prove the existence of that fact believed, i.e. the reliability of the statements. That 
tack is similar to what was done in the classic English evidence-hearsay case, Wright v. 
Tatham, (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 494-95 (Exch. Ch.). In that case, of course, a 
number of the justices concluded that the evidence in question was hearsay. Id. at 516-
17. The definition of hearsay used in the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, excludes 
“from the operation of the hearsay rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal, not 
intended as an assertion.” FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee’s note. Accordingly, 
the actions of the government in this regard would not be treated as hearsay under the 
Federal Rules. Cf. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200 cmt. (West 2009) (“[T]here is frequently a 
guarantee of the trustworthiness of the inference to be drawn from . . . nonassertive 
conduct because the actor has based his actions on the correctness of his belief, i.e., his 
actions speak louder than words.”). 
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stories that have some falsity in them.69 Most judges are likely 
to be skeptical about such claims of expertise, especially about 
whether they are strong enough to support a finding of 
reliability. 
The third part of the argument is that the process of 
questioning is “well designed” to obtain accurate information. 
What was the court referring to here? At the time, the 
government was not willing to acknowledge that it had the 
suspects in custody or that it had been interrogating them. 
Accordingly, there was no need to specify the methods used in 
interrogating them. We assume, however, that if special 
methods were being used in such interrogations, the 
government would try to keep the methods confidential and 
protected by the mantle of classified information. So we are 
faced with a factual claim that we are not able to assess 
because the facts relating to it are not available or likely to 
become available. Of course, such facts might be made 
available to the court in camera, and the court would be able to 
make a judgment (as the Moussaoui court apparently did) as to 
whether the nature of the process of interrogation assured that 
the statements obtained were sufficiently reliable.  
In the absence of more specific information, we can only 
make some very general and highly speculative observations 
about what might be the design of a process of interrogation 
that would assure sufficient reliability. If the process involved 
the use of any form of coercion, apart from the due process and 
related claims that might be raised, the very use of coercion 
would tend to cast doubt on the reliability of the statements 
made. Or suppose the process involved the use of lie detectors, 
and that is the basis for the court’s judgment of sufficient 
reliability? Again, a Pandora’s Box of issues would be opened 
by such a claim. Suppose that drugs were used in interrogating 
the suspects? Again, due process issues would arise out of such 
a process. Or suppose that the government used some type of 
special psychological or other techniques, not involving any 
prohibited coercion, in eliciting the statements from the 
suspects?70 
  
 69 The assumption thus seems to be that the persons who conduct the CIA 
(and other similar agencies) interrogations of terrorist suspects are much better at 
their job than police who conduct ordinary crime interrogations. We do not have 
enough information to make a judgment about the validity of such a claim. 
 70 See Steven Kleinman and Matthew Alexander, Op-Ed, Try a Little 
Tenderness, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2009, at A31. The authors of this article describe 
themselves as “military interrogators” who have questioned “hundreds of prisoners” 
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It is impossible to evaluate the soundness of a claim of 
sufficient circumstantial reliability without knowing the 
specific facts underlying the claim. Accordingly, the ultimate 
resolution of the claim of sufficient reliability based on the 
methods of interrogation must here be left hanging in the air. 
It would be very troubling, however, if in connection with such 
an issue classified information is provided to the judge 
regarding the interrogation techniques used—information not 
available to the public—and the judge bases a ruling in favor of 
admissibility on such information.71 
The arguments advanced in Moussaoui and Paracha for 
the circumstantial reliability of the first hearsay level of 
interrogation statements—whether grounded in intrinsic or 
extrinsic grounds—do not appear to be strong enough to 
warrant admissibility under the Federal Rules, neither under a 
specific exception nor under the residual exception of Rule 807. 
Claims that the purpose of the interrogations is to obtain 
intelligence and that the questioners’ motivation, expertise and 
methods enable them to obtain truthful information and gauge 
when it is truthful—though interesting and creative—do not in 
the end seem to be logically strong enough or to be supported 
by sufficient factual information to overcome the “presumptive 
unreliability that attaches to accomplices’ confessions that shift 
or spread blame . . . when the government is involved in the 
statements’ production, and when the statements describe past 
events and have not been subjected to adversarial testing.”72 
V. CONCLUSION 
The rationale articulated by the judges in Moussaoui-
Paracha provides the government with a line of arguments to 
  
and detainees and “supervised thousands of other interrogations.” Id. They describe a 
technique that they have used successfully that involves building a relationship with 
the person being interrogated—one based on trust, using an approach that requires 
familiarity with the detainee’s language and culture and involves a study of each 
prisoner’s case and then uses charisma and empathy to elicit intelligence. See id. They 
also propose a scientific approach to improving interrogation techniques and the 
establishment of a research center that would establish “a clear and stringent standard 
of conduct and ethics and build[] a cadre of skilled interrogators.” Id. 
 71 A serious classified information-making one’s defenses question would 
arise: Suppose the court concludes, based upon classified information about the 
interrogation process, that that process is well designed to ensure sufficient reliability. 
Suppose also, however, that the court denies access by the defendant to this classified 
information and the defendant is therefore unable to respond to and argue against that 
conclusion. Has not the defendant been denied the right to make his defenses? 
 72 Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999). 
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use in federal court terrorism prosecutions when offering into 
evidence hearsay statements, which are obtained by the 
government through questioning for intelligence purposes and 
which incriminate the defendant. More specifically, it suggests 
a pathway to explore confrontation-testimonial concerns and 
reliability-hearsay issues under the Federal Rules in regard to 
statements obtained from subsequently unavailable declarants.  
The weakest link in the argument involves the 
application of the rationale to the admissibility question at the 
first level of hearsay—that is, the admissibility of the actual 
statements made by the interrogatee. The arguments that the 
substitutions are nontestimonial under Crawford and Davis 
and that all but the first level of hearsay in the 
reports/summaries/substitutions meet the standards of Rule 
803(8), while certainly far from conclusive, have a reasonable 
chance of being successful.73 
While the suggested arguments that the government 
might make regarding the first level hearsay issue are creative, 
it seems unlikely that in a normal trial setting the government 
would (or should) prevail on that issue.74 The court’s 
argument—that the statements made by the interrogatees 
have circumstantial reliability because the government 
interrogators had a strong motivation to obtain accurate 
information or because the process of interrogation was “well 
designed” to produce accurate information—runs directly 
counter to traditional judicial concerns about the risks that 
arise from government interrogations, as reflected both in 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Crawford as well as Professor 
Berger’s views in her 1992 law review article. 
The Moussaoui reliability assertions were made in a 
compulsory process setting. There may be doubts whether even 
in that setting it should be permissible to attribute reliability 
to statements that do not have sufficient indicia of 
  
 73 But success here does not coincide with admissibility. Under FED. R. EVID. 
803(8), unless the sources have sufficient trustworthiness, the evidence does not come 
in. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8). 
 74 However, the same type of background concerns that may have influenced 
the Moussaoui and Paracha courts to articulate and then apply a reliability rationale 
in a compulsory process context—that is, concerns about releasing dangerous 
terrorists—are likely also to be present in future terrorism prosecutions. Potentially, 
these same kinds of concerns may exert some influence on judges, leading them to take 
advantage of the type of doctrinal lifeline that Moussaoui-Paracha might be seen as 
providing regarding confrontation/hearsay issues. Accordingly, it would be foolish to 
make a firm prediction that the government would be unlikely to succeed on these 
issues in future terrorism trials in the federal courts. 
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circumstantial reliability. Be that as it may, we should not be 
misled by reliability attributions made in a compulsory process 
setting to conclude that such statements should necessarily be 
admissible under hearsay rules against a criminal defendant.75  
It is noteworthy that, in the end, the hearsay 
statements at issue are most likely to founder not on 
confrontation grounds as reflected in Crawford and Davis, but 
rather on old-fashioned reliability concerns, as now only 
reflected in federal and state rules of evidence. The message is 
that while Crawford and Davis set up an additional barrier to 
admissibility framed in terms of the testimonial-nontestimonial 
distinction, a reliability standard also continues to be 
applicable, based not in the Constitution but on the rules of 
evidence.76 
  
 75 See Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified theory 
of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 627 n.167 (1978) (concluding 
that in determining whether exculpatory evidence has sufficient assurances of 
reliability to be admissible under compulsory process doctrine one should refer as a 
benchmark to whether incriminating evidence “would be deemed to possess sufficient 
‘indicia of reliability’ to be admissible against the defendant under the due process 
clause” (citations omitted)). 
  Professor Westen thus reasons from the reliability of incriminating 
evidence to the reliability of compulsory process-exculpatory admissible evidence. The 
issue posed by our hypothetical situation is the reverse: the question is whether 
sufficient reliability for admissibility of compulsory process exculpatory evidence 
should therefore be deemed sufficient reliability to make the evidence admissible 
where it is incriminatory of the defendant and raises confrontation-hearsay issues. At 
other places in the article, Professor Westen seems to indicate that the standards of 
admissibility under both the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses should be 
the same. See id. at 601 (“[T]he principles of confrontation and compulsory process are 
substantially identical . . . . While the prosecution is under a further obligation to 
present its evidence in reliable form, it is compelled to do so not by the confrontation 
clause but by the due process clause.”); see also id. at 598 (“The due process clause 
prohibits the state . . . from using any single item of evidence against a defendant 
which is inherently too unreliable for rational evaluation by the jury.”). 
 76 See Tom Cummins, Comment, Danforth v. Minnesota: The Confrontation 
Clause, Retroactivity, and Federalism, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 255, 271-72 (2009). 
